How Oct 7 take lead to di fall of Syria and di surrender of Iran

Dem go dey curse di memory of Yahya Sinwar for Tehran’s corridors of power. Sometimes for history, one pesin fit change di course of events through one incident.

Think of Gavrilo Princip wey assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand for 1914 or George Washington wey fire di first shots of di Seven Years’ War with him ambush on French forces for di Ohio Valley for 1754.

Di atrocity wey Sinwar, di late leader of Hamas, order and mastermind on Oct 7 last year don prove similarly momentous, di consequences dey reverberate well beyond di slaughter grounds of di kibbutzim on Gaza’s borders.

Each wave don weaken Iran, hurt di regional ambitions of dominance, diminish di stature and pry loose for network of proxies and clients across di Middle East.

Di latest, wey get greater magnitude than most pipo expect, dey wash over Syria so fast say e don trigger headlong panic for Tehran.

Amid di dawning realization say di Assad regime probably no fit salvage, di Iranian government scramble to evacuate its diplomats and military officers from Damascus.

So undignified and frenzied di scramble for di exits be, e take a while for stunned Middle East observers to realize say Iran dey essentially scuttle its decade-long mission to prop up di regime of Bashar al-Assad and abandon di Syrian dictator to him fate.

With rebels on di outskirts of Damascus and claims say Assad don run, di last significant element of Iran’s network of proxies and clients across di Middle East seem to dey topple at breakneck speed.

“Normally empires dey collapse gradually and then suddenly,” one Western diplomat with years of experience for di Middle East talk.

“But Iran’s informal empire, its network of influence, dey collapse very fast by historical standards. Emergency recalibration dey now under way for Tehran.”

Others dey liken am to di helplessness wey di communist regime for Moscow watch di unravelling of di Warsaw Pact for di late 1980s.

Whether such comparisons dey overblown go remain to be seen, but Western diplomats, analysts and even members of di Iranian armed forces and political establishment acknowledge say Tehran’s options dey dwindle.

If di regime go shore up its weakening position, dem talk say Iran go probably either adopt pragmatism and enta into genuine, meaningful negotiations with di West or e go race to build a nuclear warhead.

As e dey scramble to adjust to di unpredictability of Donald Trump’s incoming administration, e fit well seek to do both.

For di past week, di Iranian government don send out conflicting messages.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, one of Iran’s 15 vice-presidents, call for negotiations over di country’s nuclear programme, saying say Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new, ostensibly reform-minded president, want to “engage constructively with di West” and “manage tensions” with di United States.

At di same time, however, both di United Nations and di US intelligence agencies don conclude say Tehran don rapidly escalate work on building a nuclear weapon.

One report wey dem release on Thursday by di office of Avril Haines, di US director of national intelligence, warn say Iran don now accumulate enough material to make more than a dozen nuclear weapons.

Di following day, Rafael Grossi, di UN’s chief nuclear inspector, confirm say Iran dey quadruple its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, close to di level needed for a nuclear weapon.

In other words, Iran dey close to reach a juncture where e go decide whether e go all-in on all-out, at least for a while, for di nuclear programme.

Amid evidence of division and recrimination inside di regime, e no dey position wey Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, want find himself for anyway.

One year ago, di ayatollah dey much more comfortable position, protected, so e believe by a network of proxy and allied militias for Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

E call dem him “axis of resistance,” a “ring of fire” wey no only go defend di Shia Muslim world and Iran’s dominance within am but go one day consume Israel, a country e vow to destroy by 2040.

Di proxies, coupled with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, make Iran arguably di most powerful Muslim state for di Middle East, strong enough to be feared by both Israel and di Sunni Arab countries of di Gulf, yet di proxy strategy always risky.

E allow Iran to project power well beyond its borders, to make mischief and wage war at arm’s length and di luxury of deniability, however implausible.

But di groups e supports no always march to di beat of Iran’s drums, sometimes pursuing agendas wey no always align with Tehran’s wishes.

Dat particularly di case with Hamas, a Sunni outfit wey fit dey beholden to Iran wey provide am with arms, cash and training but wey appear no seek permission from Tehran before launching last year’s attacks.

Sinwar’s massacre unleash waves of devastation wey scythe through Iran’s Middle East policy as an enraged Israel take its vengeance first on Hamas and then on Hezbollah, wey join di fray.

Instead of di ring of fire engulfing Israel, e blow backwards, burn through neighboring states and Iran’s expensively constructed militias until di heat dey felt for Tehran itself.

Within little more than a year, Israel don severely weaken both movements, kill both Sinwar and Hassan Nasrallah, di Hezbollah leader, decapitate their high commands and eliminate thousands of their most capable fighters.

Di impact no too obvious for Syria initially. As dem nearly topple di Assad regime early for di country’s 13-year civil war, di regime turn di tide against its assorted foes thanks to Russia’s bombers and Iran’s support on di ground, much of it supplied by Hezbollah, essentially becoming an Iranian client state in di process.

Yet di truth be say, with Hezbollah dey shake, one vacuum don open up for Syria, one opportunity wey Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, one former al-Qaeda affiliate wey break away for 2017, don spend years dey train and prepare for.

Sweeping down from its bases for di north, dem seize Aleppo, wey Assad’s forces don battle for four years to reconquer, in just four days, before capturing Hama, one city wey never fall to di rebels before, racing through shattered Homs by Saturday morning and reaching di outskirts of Damascus just hours later.

In no position to save Assad, Iran dey look on impotently, concluding say, without Hezbollah, e dey impossible to save Assad for di second time.

As di situation dey unfold, staggered Iranian military insiders talk of their deep frustration at how di demoralized and underpaid Syrian army, always feeble beyond a handful of elite brigades, don simply turn tail as di rebels advance.

“Many dey surprised by their swift advance and dey reluctant to offer full support and send forces dis time,” one talk. “Some of dem talk say Assad don get 10 years to prevent dis but do nothing because he know we go dey there for am.”

Syrian rebels on Sunday claim say di Assad regime don fall.

Di cost of dis go huge for Iran. Syria na vital land bridge wey allow am to resupply Hezbollah.

One rebel victory go effectively isolate di Lebanese movement, leaving di sea di only route for rearmament, one far from ideal option. Without Syria, Iran dey deeply enfeebled.

While e get other proxies for Syria in di form of Pakistani and Afghan Shia units, wey Tehran order to fall back on Damascus in one desperate attempt to hold di capital, even dis na acknowledgement say neither dey capable enough to hold di line, let alone launch one counter-attack.

Even Iran’s Shia militias for Iraq no dey useful. Not only e no get enough time to deploy dem, but ordering dem to deploy across di border go further strain ties between Baghdad and Tehran, according to analysts.

Effectively shorn of its axis of resistance, Iran’s horizons don narrow am to one choice between pragmatism and, quite literally, going nuclear.

Pragmatism in di past

Iran don pursue pragmatism in di past, adopting warmer relations with di West during di presidency of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani from 1989 to 1997.

With Mr Pezeshkian for office, such route dey more plausible.

Di question, however, na whether Mr Trump go dey willing to countenance one rapprochement with Iran.

Although e like to make one deal, particularly one wey e fit represent as one swift foreign policy triumph, plenty Iran hawks dey for him cabinet, talk Daniel Roth, research director for United Against Nuclear Iran, one advocacy group headed by Jeb Bush, di former governor of Florida.

“Many of Trump’s cabinet picks dey very vocal in their anti-regime outlook,” e talk.

“You get pipo like Marco Rubio [secretary of state designate wey don talk many times about di real dangers of Iran.”

“So ultimately, I think Trump go wan go pretty hard on Iran.”

Sensing Iran’s weakness, Mr Trump no likely go countenance anything wey appear to be less than di complete dismantling of its nuclear programme.

Tehran’s divided regime therefore face di choice of whether e want to be one neutralized Iran on good terms with di West or one nuclear-armed country wey fit drag di Middle East into all-out war.

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