Analysis
How Nigeria has been a wedge on Igbo aspirations
In Biafra, under three years, they were making their own rockets and calculating its distances; distilling their own oil and making aviation fuel, creating in their Chemical and Biological laboratories, new cures for diseases like Cholera, shaping their own spare parts, and turning the entire East into a vast workshop, as Ojukwu put it.
At the end of the war, the Ukpabi Asika regime brought together these Biafran scientists and set up PRODA. The initiative led, in the first five years between 1970-1975 under the late Prof. Gordian Ezekwe and Mang Ndukwe, to designs of industrial machinery models and prototypes for the East Central State Industrial Masterplan, which remain undeveloped even today. The Murtala/Obasanjo regime took over PRODA in 1975 by decree, starved it of funds, and basically destroyed its aims.
Secondly, Federal government policies centralized all potentials for innovation and entrepreneurship. Before 1983, states had their Ministries of Trade and Industry. These were charged with local business registration, trade, and investment promotion, and so on. But today in Nigeria, if you wish to do any business, you’d have to go to Abuja (it used to be Lagos) to register under the Corporate Affairs Commission. It used to be that local business registration was state and municipal functions. The concentration of the leverage for trade utterly limited Igbo entrepreneurs, particularly in the era of import licensing, once your quota was exhausted, you could not do business.
This affected the old Igbo money in Aba and Onitsha, who were the arrow-heads of innovation and traditional partners in the advance of Igbo industrial economy. It is remarkable that as at 1985, a least by a book published by the Oxford Economist Tom Forrest in 1980, The Advance of African Capital, the Igbo had the highest investment in machine tools industries in all of Africa, and the highest depth of investment in rural, cottage industries. In his prediction in 1980, if that rate of investment continued, according to Forrest in 1980, the Igbo part of Africa would accomplish an industrial revolution by 1987. Now, by 1983/85, Federal government policies helped to dismantle the growth of indigenous Igbo Industry through its targeted national economic policies. As I have said, there is a corollary between industrial development and innovation.
Thirdly, the severe, strategic staunching of huge capital in-flow into the East starved Igbo businesses and institutions of the capacity to utilize or even expand their capacities. There were no strategic Federal Capital projects in the East. There were no huge infrastructural investments in the East. The last major Federal government investment in Igbo land was the Niger Bridge which was commissioned in 1966. Any region starved of government funds experiences catatony and attrition. Private capital is often not enough to create the kind of synergy necessary for innovation. Rather than invest in the East, from 1970 to date, the Federal government has strategically closed down every capacity for technological advancement in the East and stripped that region of its capacity.
By 1966, the Eastern Nigerian Gas masterplan had been completed under Okpara. But in its review of a Nigeria gas masterplan, the Federal government strategically circumvented the East. Oil and Gas are under Federal oversight. The Trans-Amadi to Aba Industrial Gas network/linkage had been completed in 1966, to pipe gas from Port-Harcourt to Aba. The Federal government let that go into abeyance and uprooted the already reticulated pipes. The East was denied access to energy with the destruction of the Power stations during the war.
The Mbakwe government sought to remedy this by embarking on two highly critical area of investment necessary for industrial life: the 5 Zonal water projects, which were 75 completed by 1983, and set for commissioning in 1984, which was to supply clean water for domestic and industrial use to all parts of the old Imo state, and the Amaraku and Izombe Power stations, under the Imo Rural Electrification Project. These were the first ever massive independent power projects ever carried out by any state government in Nigeria which would have made significant part of Igbo land energy independent today. The supply of daily electricity was possible in Imo as at 1984. The Amaraku station had come on stream, and the Izombe Gas station was underway, when Buhari and his men struck.
The first order of business under the Buhari govt in January 1984, was to declare all that investment by Mbakwe “white elephant projects.” They were abandoned, and left to decay.
Ground had already been acquired and cleared on the Umuahia-Okigwe road to commence work by the South Korean Auto firm, Hyundai, under a partnership with Imo for the Hyundai Assembly plant in Umuahia, to cater to a West African market. The first order of business under the Buhari government in January 1984, was to declare all that investment by Mbakwe “white elephant projects.” They were abandoned, and left to decay. The equipment at the Amaraku power station was later sold in parts by Joe Aneke during Abacha’s government. Some of the industries like the Paint and Resins company, and the Aluminium Extrusion plant in Inyishi were privatized, and sold. Projects like the massive Ezinachi Clay & Brick works at Okigwe are at various stages of decay, as memorial to all that effort.
Forthly, you may not remember but Odumegwu Ojukwu founded and opened the first Nigerian University of Technology – the University of Technology Port-Harcourt in 1967, under the leadership of prof. Kenneth Dike. He had also compelled Shell to establish the First Petroleum Technology Training Institute in Port-Harcourt in 1966. All these were dismantled. The PTI was take from Port-Harcourt to Warri, while University of Tech, P/H was reduced to a campus of UNN, until 1975, when it became Uniport. You will recall that for years, up till 1981, the only institutions of higher learning in Central Eastern Nigeria were the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, IMT Enugu and Alvan Ikoku College of Ed, in Owerri. There is no innovation without centers of strategic research.
Mbakwe and Jim Nwobodo changed all that in 1981, when they pushed through their various states Assembly, the bills establishing the old Anambra State Univ. of Tech (ASUTHECH), under the presidency of Kenneth Dike, and the IMOSU with its five campuses under the presidency of Prof MJC Echeruo. The master plan for these universities as epicenters of research and innovation in the East were effectively grounded with the second coming of the military in 1984, and the diminution of their mission through underfunding, etc. As I have said, I have given you the very short version. After a brief glimpse of light between 1979-83, Igbo land witnessed the highest form of attrition from 1983- date, and the destruction of the efforts of its public leadership to restore it to its feet has been strategic.
Some have been intimidated, and the Igbo themselves have grown very cynical from that experience of deep alienation from Nigeria. I think you should be a little less cynical of Igbo attempts to re-situate themselves in the Nigerian federation: starved of funds, starved of investments, subjected to regulatory strictures from a powerful central government which sees the East in adversarial terms, and often threatened, the Igbo themselves grew cynical of it all. You may recall, the first move by the governors of the former Eastern Region to meet under the aegis of the old Eastern Region’s Governors Conference in 1999, was basically checkmated by Obasanjo who threatened them after they called for confederation in response to the Sharia issue in the North.
Their attempts to establish liaison offices in Enugu and create a regional partnership was considered very threatening by the federal government under Obasanjo, that not too long after, they abandoned that move, and that was it. If people cannot be allowed to organize for the good of their constituents, then it only means one thing: it is not in the interest of certain vested interests in Nigeria for a return of a common ground in the Eastern part of Nigeria because establishing that kind of common ground threatens the balance of power. It is even immaterial if such a common ground leads to Nigeria’s ultimate benefit. There are people who just find the idea of a common, progressive partnership of the old Eastern Region threatening to their own long term interests. This is precisely what is going on – its undercurrent. This of course cannot be permitted to go on forever. A generation arises which often says, “No! in Thunder.”
The Trans-Amadi to Aba Industrial Gas network/linkage had been completed in 1966, to pipe gas from Port Harcourt to Aba. The FG let that go into abeyance and uprooted the already reticulated pipes.
Igbo population is quite huge, and people who truly know understand that the Igbo constitute the single largest ethnic nation in Nigeria. Much has been made about how this so-called “small” Igbo land space could accommodate the vast Igbo population. But People also forget that Igbo land accommodated Igbo who fled from everywhere else in 1967. So, the question of whether Igbo land is large enough to contain the Igbo is a non-issue. In any case, Biafra is not only the land of the Igbo. It goes far beyond Igbo land. But even for the sake of building scenarios, we stick to Igbo land alone – the great Igbo cities of Enugu, Port-Harcourt, Owerri, Aba, Onitsha, Asaba, Abakaliki, Umuahia, Awka and Onitsha are yet to be reach even 30% of their capacities.
New arteries can be built, facilities expanded; there are innovative ways of moving populations through new transportation platforms -underneath, above, on the surface, and by waterways. The East of Nigeria has one of the most complex and connected, and largely disused system of natural river waterways in the world. New, ecologically habitable towns can be expanded to form new cities from the Grade A Townships – Agbor, Obiaruku, Aboh, Oguta, Mgbidi, Orlu, Ihiala, Amawbia/Ekwuluobia, Elele/Ahoada, Owerrinta, Bonny, Asa, Arochukwu, Afikpo, Okigwe, and so on. The Igbo will be fine. The Japanese and the Dutch, for example, have proved that there are innovative ways of using constricted space.
As for the economy: it is supply and demand. New economic policies will integrated Igbo economy to the central West African and West African Markets. The Igbo will create a new vast export network, unhindered by idiotic economic and foreign policies. The re-activation of the PH port systems will for e.g. open the closed economic corridor once and for all to global trade. As anybody knows, it might take a fast train no more than 45 minutes to move goods from the Warri or Sapele ports to Aba and even in less time to Onitsha. As Diette Spiff once observed while playing golf at Oguta, all it would take to connect Warri and Oguta is just a long bridge, and the vast economic movement will commence between Warri and its traditional trading areas of Onitsha and the rest of the East.
The quantum of economic activity will see the growth of that corridor between Aba-Oguta- Obiaruku down to Warri as the crow flies. The impact of trade between the Calabar ports and Aba will explode. In fact, the old trading stations along the Qua-Iboe River (the Cross River) at Arochukwu, Afikpo, down to Oron and Mamfe in the Cameroons will explode and create new prosperity and new opportunities. I am giving the short version. So, the Igbo will be alright. They would simply be just able to define their own development strategies, deploy their highly trained manpower currently wasting unutilized, and the basis of its vast middle class will create new consumers, and generate an internal energy that will thrive on Igbo innovation, industry, and know-how, which Nigeria currently suppresses. This is exactly one very possible scenario.
So, Tanko Yakassi is wrong. May be if the Igbo leave Kano, the Emir will no longer need to buy his bulb from an Igbo trader in Kano. He will have to buy it either from an Hausa, a Fulani, a Lebanese, or some such person. But those will have to come to Igbo land to buy it first before selling to the Emir. There was a time when all of West Africa came to Onitsha or Aba to buy and trade because it was safe, and those cities were the largest market emporia in the continent. People came from as far away as the Congo to buy stuff in Aba and sell in the Congo. It could happen again, only this time on a vaster, more controlled scale. The network of Igbo global trade will not stop if they left Nigeria. In fact, they will have more access to an indigenous credit system that would expand that trade, currently unobtainable and unavailable today to them, because Nigeria makes it impossible for Igbo business to grow through all kinds of restrictions strategically imposed on it, including port restrictions.
However, although I do think that the Igbo would do quite well alone, they could do a lot better with Nigeria, if the conditions are right. This agitation is for the conditions to be made right; for Nigeria and its political and economic policies to stop being a wedge on Igbo aspirations. And Igbo aspiration is quite simple: to match the rest of the developed world inch by every inch, and not to be held down by the Nigerian millstone of corruption, inefficiency, and inferiority. The Igbo think that control of their public policies on education, research and innovation, economic and monetary policies, and recruitment, control and deployment of its own work force both in public and private sectors will give them the leverage they need to build a coherent and civilized society.
They point to the example of Biafra, where under three years, they were making their own rockets and calculating its distances; distilling their own oil and making aviation fuel, creating in their Chemical and Biological laboratories, new cures for diseases like Cholera, shaping their own spare parts, and turning the entire East into a vast workshop, as Ojukwu put it, while Nigeria was busy doing owambe, importing even toothpick, and creating new wartime millionaires from corrupt contracting systems by a powerful oligopoly. It is a fallacy much driven by ignorance that Igbo will not thrive and that Igbo land will not accommodate Igbo population if they leave. That is not true. There is no scientific basis for it.
The dynamics of human movement will take great care of all that. It’s a lame excuse. What people who wish for Nigeria to stay together should do is not to make such puerile statements, because it is meaningless. What we should all do is to find the strategic means of containing Igbo discontent by LISTENING to the Igbo, and seeking peaceful and productive ways of fully freeing their energy to instigate growth both of themselves and of Nigeria within Nigeria for everyone’s benefit. Threatening them will not work. It has never worked, and it is important to understand a bit of Igbo cultural psychology: the more you threaten him, the more the Igbo person digs in very stubbornly. Igbo, with a long tradition of diplomacy, thrive on consensus not on threat of the use of force, or the like.
Frankly, those who continue to think that the Igbo have no options are yet to understand the complexity of this movement as we speak. They still look at the surface of events while the train is revving and about to leave the station. We need to work very carefully on this issue. I myself, I prefer Nigeria. I like its color of many peoples and cultures. That in itself is the very condition for growth and regeneration. A single Igbo nation may be more prosperous, but will be less interesting, and that is the more valid argument.
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For countless men, penis size stirs deep anxiety fed by social media, locker-room banter, and pressure from adult content.
But sex experts and urologists agree: size rarely determines sexual function or fertility.
In a revealing conversation with PUNCH Healthwise, clinical sexologist Cecilia Agu and consultant urologist Dr. Gabriel Ogah broke down the myths emphasizing emotional connection, overall health, and sperm quality as far more meaningful indicators of sexual well-being.
Sexual Satisfaction Lies Beyond Size
Agu, who specializes in human sexology, has heard the insecurities countless times. Yet she insists that the fixation on size overshadows what truly matters in intimate relationships.
“Women value intimacy, chemistry, and creativity not centimeters,” she explained, her tone both compassionate and pragmatic.
“In most cases, size doesn’t determine performance or biological capacity. Only rare, clinically significant conditions impact size.”
She points to societal myths that equate larger size with virility.
“Historic portrayals in art and literature, and today’s media, amplify stereotypes. Pornography exaggerates, turning a normal variation into unreasonable expectations.”
Agu also cautioned against the booming market selling “enhancement” remedies.
“That industry profits off insecurity peddling pills, gadgets, and herbal supplements with no proven benefit.
The real dilemma lies in emotional weariness, not physical deficiency.”
She acknowledged true medical conditions like micropenis, often linked to hormonal or genetic causes but emphasized their rarity.
“Anyone worried about hormonal imbalances or developmental issues should seek professional evaluation,” she advised.
“Fertility Is Unrelated to Size” Dr. Gabriel Ogah
Dr. Ogah, a respected urologist, offered a no-nonsense medical perspective on the fertility question.
“A small penis doesn’t reduce a man’s ability to impregnate a woman,” he stated firmly.
“If sperm is healthy and ejaculation occurs, fertilization can happen.”
He added that many young men consult him out of anxiety sparked by unrealistic comparisons.
“Almost always, their size falls within healthy norms. It’s undue stress, fueled by exposure to distorted media portrayals.”
Dr. Ogah also debunked the idea that older men can “restore” diminishing function through enhancement products.
“As absurd as it sounds, many try. But no pill or serum can permanently alter anatomy.
These are myths masquerading as solutions.”
So What Truly Matters?
Both experts agree: prioritizing overall health, emotional intimacy, and stress-free communication far outweighs anxiety over size.
Agu stressed that sex is about connection, not metrics. “Being nervous about measurements sets couples up for dissatisfaction.
But when you focus on pleasure, emotional safety, and experimentation, the experience transforms.”
Dr. Ogah echoed this, emphasizing regular health check-ups. “Good cardiovascular health, balanced hormones, and mental well-being are key. Size doesn’t affect that.”
Dispelling the Myths, Sustaining the Confidence
As myths dissolve under scientific clarity, a bigger concern emerges: how do we nurture a culture free of body shaming? Agu proposed educational steps.
“We should teach young people that anatomy varies. Performance is multi-dimensional. Communication trumps comparison every time.”
Dr. Ogah endorsed that sentiment. “Let’s shift the narrative. Appreciate function over form. Listen to your body, and care for it through healthy living.”
Performance Isn’t About Inches
Size remains largely irrelevant when partners are emotionally in sync, focused on connection, and attuned to shared pleasure.
Fertility hinges on sperm health not size.
Medical concerns like micropenis are rare, but deserve medical evaluation.
Media, culture, and marketing distort reality. Let’s counter that with facts.
Confidence and sexual well-being stem from health, honesty, and intimacy not obsession with size.
In the end, as Agu beautifully summed up, “It’s not the size it’s how you share it.” That truth holds far more value than any number on a measuring tape.
You have to suspend emotional reasoning if you want to relate to this commentary. Like a child, be pure in your heart and see Soludo and Peter Obi as two students competing for the best result to gain a sole scholarship.
The sole scholarship is up for grabs, and they are fighting for the best grade. Today, I want to discourse about two competitive students.
Let me get rid of allusion and be more direct.
Soludo and Obi are in a healthy competition for who will champion the Igbo presidency struggle. The two are fantastic options. I don’t have a choice yet, but let’s take a factual look into the prospects.
The Soludo you see in Anambra State Government House is using that position as a template and constructing his path to the presidency. There is a reason he is performing, and there is a possibility he will outperform Peter Obi by the time his eight years come to an end.
The scholarship in this context is the presidential office. An Igbo president is being considered, and the scorecards of all Igbo governors are being assessed.
When you wonder how Soludo is able to construct roads. Pay civil servants. Employ more teachers, and build infrastructure and social amenities. Establish a security outfit to fight insecurity. Provide multiple skill acquisitions and fund Anambra youths to make ends meet with the free skills acquired, free antenatal and post-antenatal care, free education, and hospitals for each local government with almost zero borrowing, and then you can start to see the bigger picture.
Governor Chukwuma Soludo is going to break more records in his second term. Frankly, I don’t want to talk about the coming governorship election because there is practically no election happening; it’s a one-horse race election.
If you keenly look at what Governor Chukwuma Soludo has achieved in his first term with almost zero borrowing, you would be forced to ask, “How is it possible?”
Past governors borrowed hundreds of billions and ended up constructing roads, but Chukwuma Soludo, throughout his 3.5 years, has constructed more roads and constructed a new government house. Touched social amenities and infrastructures, even funded youths like a father funds his sons after enrolling them in a school of skills acquisition. The roads he is constructing are more durable.
Soludo in three and a half years has practically done great in the state. Discussing with my friend, who told me that the governor is setting a new standard, I objected to him and made it clear that it would be hard for other governors to follow in his footsteps.
When Soludo came up with his tax initiative, the pain was sharp, but over time, it appears to have subsided because he is using the taxpayers’ money for projects in the state.
Soludo’s predecessor left an almost empty purse, and borrowing was inevitable, but his determination to run a government of inclusive financial responsibility led him to raise money within the state and use it judiciously.
Governor Alex Otti borrows hundreds of billions of Naira and constructs a road in Aba; social media obedients hail him like he had done any extraordinary thing, but when Soludo does even more without borrowing, the extraordinary achievement is met with deafening silence from them.
On social media, obedients have become mediocre and hypocritical. This is a fact and not criticism.
Peter Obi needs to come clean and end politics of emotion and pity. He is not a strategist, and one wonders how he would succeed in the strategic arena of Nigerian politics. If he continues to whip up emotions and sentiments with the hope of taking advantage of the two to win the Nigerian presidential election, then he is dreaming.
Soludo, on the other hand, is a strategist and realistic person. He is devoid of sentiment and embraces the toughness needed to lead. He tells you what he wants or will do and quickly proceeds to execution. Above all, he doesn’t claim to be holier than thou.
He contested the governorship election in 2010 against Peter Obi; after he lost the election, he went back and strategized. He waited and identified the right persons and won the election on the second attempt. That’s a strategic approach to execution.
Slimy characters who play the holier-than-thou game end up turning into beasts once given the mantra.
For instance, Peter Obi attended Rev. Father Mbaka’s fundraising service, but when called to donate money, he deceitfully objected. Why did he attend in the first place, and why can’t he donate like others? Because he wants to play the holier-than-thou game.
Like Soludo, Obi tried during his term as a governor. He saved money for the state, and that was his signature deed as a governor. But what is the essence of saving state money you could easily invest to help the people or maximize the stakes of the state?
My brother once told me that a man that runs every day to save his money in a bank is a man who doesn’t know what to do with the money he has. He said he would rather invest his money in something for inflow and outflow than primitively save it.
Soludo is someone that bares his mind irrespective of the odds against him. But I am afraid of Peter Obi’s cunning lifestyle.
Mr. Peter Obi has constantly said he didn’t borrow money during his term in office, but available records say otherwise. That is where my fear lies. Do we truly know who Peter Obi is? An angel you don’t know is not better than a devil you know. This is my stream of thought, and I have evidence.
When the Pandora Papers were leaked, to my greatest surprise, Peter Obi’s name was there, but we all feigned ignorance of the implication. Why was our spotless Messiah’s name on the list of those who hide their money to evade taxes? What was Peter hiding?
By virtue of the Pandora Papers, Peter has something in his cupboard. He should stop telling us about wearing only one pair of shoes. About not living lavishly. About not sleeping in five-star hotels and others. If he doesn’t do all these but has money hidden somewhere, those that do all he doesn’t do are better than him.
In this journey, we want a devil we know and not an angel we don’t know.
Before I end this commentary, I want to draw a significant line of comparison between these two students.
Soludo inherited Biafra-related insecurity. Peter Obi created Biafra-related insecurity during his term in office.
Soludo is fighting and dislodging camps of UGM in Anambra State without any major massacre. Peter Obi, during his time as governor, recorded the Ezu River massacre, etcetera.
Despite facing significant inherited security challenges, Soludo has not pressed the panic button by declaring endless curfews across the state. Under Peter, Anambra recorded curfews that threw the state in fear. Youths were massacred for having tribal marks in the process.
On the borrowing debate that Mr. Peter Obi put forward as the greatest thing he achieved in Anambra. I asked AI to gather all the official records of Anambra finances during his 8-year rule. Below is the verdict. AI says Mr. Peter Obi is a liar.
AI’s Verdict:
Records of Anambra State Finances from 2006 to 2014
Based on available data from official sources like the Nigerian Debt Management Office (DMO), secondary analyses (e.g., StatiSense, BudgIT reports), and fact-check reports, below is a summary of Anambra State’s financial records focusing on debt profiles during Peter Obi’s governorship (March 2006 to March 2014). Note that comprehensive year-by-year financial statements (e.g., full budgets, revenues, expenditures) are not always publicly detailed in accessible formats for every year, but debt data is the most relevant and available metric for assessing borrowing. Data inconsistencies exist across sources (e.g., due to reporting methods or updates), so I’ve noted sources and prioritized DMO-derived figures where possible.
Key Financial Context
Revenue and Budget Trends: Anambra’s annual budgets grew from approximately ₦66 billion in 2007 to ₦110 billion in 2014, driven by federal allocations, internally generated revenue (IGR), and grants. IGR increased from ₦4.5 billion in 2006 to ₦10.4 billion in 2013, reflecting Obi’s emphasis on fiscal prudence. Obi claimed to have left ₦75 billion in savings (including cash and investments) upon handover, though this is disputed as including overvalued assets or liabilities.
Overall Fiscal Performance: Anambra was rated the least indebted state by DMO in 2013-2014 relative to peers, with low debt-to-revenue ratios. However, debt obligations existed and fluctuated.
Sources Used: DMO reports (via secondary extractions like StatiSense and fact-checks), BudgIT’s “Nigeria’s Debt Status” PDF (2019), NBS reports, and verified fact-checks (e.g., Guardian, ICIR).
No full 2006-2010 domestic debt figures were directly extractable from DMO PDFs due to access limitations, but trends are inferred from available data.
Debt Records (External and Domestic)
Debt is divided into external (foreign loans, e.g., from the World Bank, multilateral agencies) and domestic (local borrowings, e.g., from banks or bonds). Figures show Anambra had inherited debt in 2006, with some increases during Obi’s tenure.
External Debt (in USD millions, sourced from DMO via StatiSense reports):
2006: $18.87 (inherited at start of tenure)
2008: $18.89 (minimal change)
2010: $21.30 (slight increase)
2012: $24.45
2013: $30.32 (per DMO fact-check data)
2014: $45.15 (end of tenure; note: Obi left office in March 2014, so part of this may reflect early-year draws)
Trend: External debt more than doubled from $18.87M to $45.15M, indicating new borrowings or drawdowns on existing facilities (e.g., World Bank loans for erosion control and education, some allocated for post-tenure use).
Domestic Debt (in ₦ billions, sourced from BudgIT PDF, DMO via fact-checks, and Nairaland/DMO summaries; inconsistencies noted):
2006-2010: No precise year-by-year figures found in accessible DMO data. Aggregated state domestic debt nationally was rising post-2005 Paris Club relief, but Anambra’s share was low (estimated at <₦5B in 2006 based on trends; exact amount unconfirmed).
2011: ₦6.43 (per DMO via Nairaland) or ₦10.30 (per BudgIT; possible reporting variance)
2012: ₦18.47 (per BudgIT)
2013: ₦3.03 (per DMO fact-check) or ₦7.86 (per BudgIT)
2014: ₦11.05 (per BudgIT; post-handover figure, but reflective of end-2013 obligations)
Trend: Domestic debt fluctuated, peaking around 2012 before declining in 2013 (possibly due to repayments), then rising slightly by 2014. Overall, it remained low compared to other states (e.g., Lagos had ₦200B+ in 2013).
Total Debt (Combined External + Domestic, approximate conversions at historical rates of ~₦150-200/USD):
2006: ~$18.87M external + estimated low domestic (<₦5B) = Total ~₦3-5B equivalent.
2013 (near end of tenure): $30.32M external (~₦4.8B) + ₦3.03B domestic = Total ~₦7.8B.
2014: $45.15M external (~₦7.2B) + ₦11.05B domestic = Total ~₦18.25B.
Other Financial Notes:
Liabilities Beyond Loans: Obi inherited ₦35B in unpaid pensions/gratuities (cleared during tenure). Successor Willie Obiano claimed ₦127B in liabilities (e.g., unfinished contracts), not all loans.
Savings and Investments: Obi reported leaving $156M in foreign savings and ₦36B in cash/investments, verified by DMO as contributing to low net debt.
Borrowing Specifics: Mentions of a $60M World Bank interest-free loan (negotiated but for successor) and ₦1B farmer loans (state-facilitated, not direct state debt).
Data Gaps: Full audits for 2006-2010 are scarce; DMO annual reports focus on national aggregates, not state breakdowns pre-2011.
Verdict on Whether Peter Obi Loaned or Borrowed Money:
Yes, Peter Obi did oversee the collection of loans or borrowings during his tenure as Anambra State governor. While Obi has claimed he “never borrowed from any financial institution” and left no debt, this is misleading based on official DMO records.
The state carried and increased debt obligations under his administration:
Evidence of Borrowing: External debt rose from $18.87M (inherited) in 2006 to $45.15M in 2014, a ~140% increase, implying new loans or drawdowns (e.g., multilateral facilities). Domestic debt, though fluctuating and low, was present and managed, with peaks suggesting borrowings for projects.
Nuances: Much debt may have been inherited or non-commercial (e.g., World Bank grants/loans for infrastructure). Obi emphasized avoiding “unproductive” borrowing, clearing liabilities like pensions, and leaving savings—Anambra was indeed the least indebted state per DMO. However, formal debt existed and grew, contradicting absolute “no debt” claims.
Fact-Check Consensus: Multiple verifications (e.g., Guardian, ICIR) rate his no-debt claim as false or misleading, citing DMO data showing ~₦7.8B total debt in 2013.
In summary, while fiscally prudent overall, the records confirm borrowing occurred.
Author: Ifeanyi Chijioke
The dust has barely settled on the Anambra South Senatorial election, yet its real meaning is only beginning to reveal itself.
On the surface, Chief Emma Nwachukwu of APGA clinched the seat after a fiercely contested race. But beneath the headlines lies a calculated strategy, one that points to Governor Charles Chukwuma Soludo’s long-term political agenda.
Viewed through the lens of political chess, Emma Nwachukwu is not merely a senator-elect. He is a placeholder, a pawn carefully positioned to secure Anambra South for Governor Soludo’s eventual use.
For the governor, this was no ordinary election; it was about locking down a seat he intends to occupy once his governorship tenure runs its full course.
Governor Chukwuma Charles Soludo of Anambra State
Soludo understands the importance of Anambra South. Beyond being the wealthiest and most politically charged district in the state, it is the gateway to influence at both local and national levels.
To control Anambra South is to command leverage, resources, and elite alignment. Allowing an independent force to hold the seat would have posed long-term risks to his plans.
This explains why it was worth every naira, every mobilization, and every ounce of political capital to ensure APGA’s grip on the senatorial seat.
For Soludo, it wasn’t just about winning an election; it was about securing access to a future platform.
But here’s the deeper layer: Soludo knows APGA, for all its sentimental value in Anambra, cannot propel him to a credible presidential bid.
The plan, therefore, is simple. At the right time, he will transition to the Senate, and in due course, align with the ruling party at the center, most likely the APC. With that move, the Anambra South seat transforms from a local mandate into a national bargaining chip.
From governorship to Senate, and from Senate to the presidential chessboard; this is the arc Soludo is plotting.
Emma Nwachukwu, then, is not the final destination; he is the bridge, the placeholder, the pawn whose role is to keep the square warm until the king is ready to make his move.
The election may be over, but the real game has only just begun.
Arthur Ezechukwu is a strategic communications consultant, political analyst, and media director with experience in campaign messaging, brand positioning, and executive communications. Passionate about governance and public affairs, he brings a sharp lens to political dynamics, unpacking the motives and long-term strategies that shape Nigeria’s power play.
When news broke last week, the operatives of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) stormed the Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library.
My reaction was not shock but recognition. I had seen this pattern before — the sudden spectacle, the images of armed men, the swift headlines — and I knew the uneasy feelings it could leave behind.
I first walked into the EFCC headquarters years ago not as a suspect but as a citizen who believed in its mission. I came with information and resources that I believed could strengthen the fight against corruption.
The author, Basil Odilim Enwegbara
In those early moments, there was optimism — the sense that this was an institution committed to fairness, thoroughness, and results.
But as time passed, that optimism was tested. Processes slowed. Meetings shifted. What I had imagined would be a model of transparency became, to my eyes, more opaque. I had also worked on a public reporting initiative with the EFCC, designed to make petitions traceable by citizens. Over time, that vision for open tracking did not take root in the way I had hoped.
My view of the EFCC began to change. It was not that the institution was incapable of decisive action — quite the opposite. It could act with speed and force when it chose to. But that force seemed, in my perception, unevenly applied. Some matters blazed into the public eye; others dimmed quietly in the shadows.
That is why, when EFCC Chairman Ola Olukoyede recently warned that Nigeria’s real estate sector had become a haven for money laundering, I agreed with the diagnosis.
Anyone who drives through certain high-end districts in Lagos or Abuja can see properties that stand empty, owned on paper, but not in life are priced far beyond the reach of most Nigerians The challenge is not seeing the problem — it is pursuing it with the same intensity in every case, no matter whose name appears on the deeds.
Raids like the one on the Obasanjo Library generate headlines. They display power. But Nigerians have long memories. For every dramatic operation, there are questions about the cases that remain invisible — the files not announced, the investigations never heard of again.
If the EFCC is to be the institution Nigerians need, it must not only fight corruption without fear or favour; it must do so in a way the public can see and trust.
Without that trust, the EFCC risks becoming something the law never intended: a force whose power is remembered more for its theatre than for its justice.
Selective Justice and the Shielding of the Powerful
Go to the EFCC headquarters in Industrial Area, Abuja, and you’ll see some hungry boys arrested for stealing a few hundreds of dollars.
That doesn’t mean that what they did was right. What I’m saying here is that EFCC leaves the big thieves and always goes after petty thieves.
Or how many powerful politicians and influential figures have truly faced prison in Nigeria? The answer is painfully clear: very few, if any.
The harsh reality is that accountability disproportionately targets the vulnerable—the so-called “yahoo boys,” the hungry and desperate youth who often become scapegoats for systemic failure.
Meanwhile, the elites who wield power and influence glide through the cracks of the justice system, shielded by networks of patronage, political alliances, and wealth.
Consider Godwin Emefiele, the former Central Bank Governor. Despite serious allegations and public outcry, he has remained protected within the corridors of power.
His case is emblematic of a broader problem—one where the scales of justice tip heavily in favor of the privileged, while ordinary Nigerians bear the brunt of corruption and abuse.
This selective enforcement not only betrays the principle of equality before the law but corrodes public trust in our institutions. When justice becomes a tool wielded only against the powerless, it fosters cynicism, apathy, and social fragmentation.
True reform demands that the judiciary break free from this pattern of selective justice. No one, regardless of political stature or wealth, should be above the law. For Nigeria to rise and thrive, the law must be applied fairly, transparently, and without fear or favor.
My fight is not just personal—it is a fight for every Nigerian who dreams of a nation where justice is not a privilege but a right.
Truly, if eyes can bleed blood, given what I’ve seen in Nigeria, my eyes should have by now be bleeding blood. Thank God eyes only shed tears.
Analysis
The Caricature Called Nigerian Judiciary: I Discovered Forgery After Court Had Already Accepted It
By Basil Odilim
Cry or laugh — take your pick. But this is what the Nigerian judiciary has been reduced to.
For years, I thought I knew everything that was going on in my own court case. I was there. I was cross-examined. I had lawyers. I followed up.
But it turns out, the most damaging thing happened without my knowledge — and only came to light recently, when I personally obtained and reviewed the Certified True Copy (CTC) of the court proceedings.
I filed my civil suit in 2017. The defendant didn’t respond for over a year. Then, in January 2019, I was cross-examined. It was a strange session.
Their lawyer pulled out a document and claimed I had received it and signed for it. I looked at it and said, “No. I’ve never seen this document, and I never signed it.”
He withdrew it. Then, casually asked me, “How many signatures do you use?” I told him, “Two.” He gave me a blank sheet of paper and asked me to sign both versions. I didn’t know what he was planning to do with it, but I signed.
Unbeknownst to me, that blank sheet — with nothing on it but two fresh examples of my signature — was immediately tendered as an exhibit. The court admitted it.
Still, no defence had been filed at that time. Then, two weeks later, on February 2, 2019, the defendant finally submitted its defence. I didn’t think much of it — until recently, when I finally obtained the full case file and the CTC of the court proceedings.
That’s when the pieces came together — and the forgery revealed itself.
Attached to the defendant’s belated statement of defence was a photocopy of the very document I had denied under oath. But this time, it had my name on it — or at least something resembling it. “Odilim Enwegbaram”.
Not Enwegbara. It was misspelled. Worse, it had been inserted over a visibly tippexed line — the only part of the document with correction fluid.
Then came the signature. It wasn’t quite mine, but close — close enough to raise questions.
That’s when it hit me: they had lifted my signature from the blank sheet I signed in court. They had fabricated the document after the cross-examination, then quietly attached it to their court filings, and waited.
How did the court allow this?
As I read through the CTC, I discovered what really happened during the tendering of that document — something I wasn’t even fully aware of at the time.
When the defence attempted to present the forged document through their witness (DW1), my lawyer raised a strong objection. He cited Sections 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act: a photocopy is not admissible unless the original is lost or destroyed and that loss must be properly established.
The judge asked the obvious question: “Where is the original?”
DW1 said, “It got lost in my office.”
Then the defence counsel stood up — and directly contradicted him. He told the court: “No, the original isn’t lost. The Claimant has it.”
Think about that. One says it’s lost. The other says it’s with me. But the document is a forged photocopy. The original was never produced — likely because it never existed.
Yet, the judge overruled the objection and admitted the document. She said she would decide later how much “weight” to give it. It was marked as an exhibit.
No one questioned the misspelling, the tippex, or the fact that the document was smuggled in after my signatures had been harvested under cross-examination.
Years passed. Then, on June 30, 2025, DW1 was cross-examined again — this time by my new counsel. Under oath, he admitted clearly: “there was no contract between the Defendant and me”
Finally, I thought. The truth has landed.
But when I received the CTC of the judgment on July 28, 2025, that admission was no longer there.
It had been replaced by this sentence: “There is a contract… by signage of the guide.”
That “guide” was the same forged, tippexed document. The one I never signed. The one bearing a spelling of my name I’ve never used. The one cobbled together using signatures I gave on a plain sheet in court — with no context and no warning.
So now, years later, I’m left with a legal judgment based on a document I never saw, never signed, and only discovered through forensic reading of the CTC.
This isn’t just about my case.
This is about how easily the truth can be rewritten in Nigeria’s courtrooms. How the law — and even sworn testimony — can be bent to accommodate fraud. And how a litigant can sit through an entire trial, not knowing that a false record has already been smuggled into evidence.
The lesson is simple: you must be involved. Deeply. Personally. Painfully.
Your lawyer might mean well, but they’re juggling ten other cases. You’re juggling only one — your own. And if you don’t read every document, get every transcript, and demand every record, you may find that the truth of your case has been changed — and nobody told you.
Cry or laugh, depending on which you prefer. But this is what our judiciary has been reduced to.
Winning the Judgment, Losing the Nation
I never planned to immerse myself in the tangled undergrowth of Nigerian jurisprudence. My life’s compass was set toward the frontiers of human possibility — human immortality, cellular neovsis, and the permanent cure for cancer. Yet, here I am, drawn unwillingly into the crumbling temple of justice, because you cannot live in a burning house and pretend the flames belong to someone else.
Is it too late to think deeply about jurisprudence and the public good? No — because when a society loses its moral and legal direction, all other progress becomes an illusion.
Plato was right: “Justice in the life and conduct of the State is possible only as first it resides in the hearts and souls of the citizens.”
Consider Nnamdi Kanu. Kenya’s High Court has already declared his abduction unlawful, inhumane, and a violation of international norms.
Yet in Nigeria, the same case — already decided in another sovereign court — staggers on as if the foreign judgment were a rumour. This is not merely legal defiance; it is judicial terrorism by the state itself.
The corrosion is systemic. Section 174(1)(c) of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution empowers the Attorney-General to “discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority or person.”
Section 211(1)(c) mirrors this power for states. Both require, in subsection (3), that the power be exercised in the public interest, in the interest of justice, and to prevent abuse of legal process.
In theory, this is a noble safeguard. In practice, it too often becomes a political escape hatch.
In Anambra State, the Attorney-General moved to terminate criminal proceedings, and the President of the Nigerian Bar Association rushed to defend him, invoking the constitutional imperative while ignoring the political convenience. The law was cited, but the “public interest” — the reason the power exists — was conveniently absent.
Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote: “The foundations of justice are that no one shall suffer wrong; then, that the public good be promoted.”
Justinian defined justice as “the constant and perpetual wish to render every man his due.” By these standards, selective justice is not justice at all — it is politics in robes.
The Nigerian Supreme Court, in _State v. Ilori once described the Attorney-General as “a master unto himself… under no control whatsoever” in exercising these powers. Without moral restraint, such unbridled discretion becomes an instrument of state capture, not state service.
History warns us. Rome began as a republic of laws but rotted into an empire of men when those entrusted with justice served power instead of truth. Nigeria is edging toward that same precipice.
It is not too late to resist. But the clock is not generous. A nation that manipulates justice to suit political ends may win its cases — but it will lose its soul.
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