The news that Iran is exploring the possibility of using a radiological or chemical attack against US officials have emerged amid growing tension between Washington and Tehran.
According to a CNN report, quoting seven anonymous US officials, Iran’s intelligence agency has examined various options regarding targeting US officials in Washington, DC, using either a dirty bomb or a chemical weapon.
However, there is no proof provided to the CNN report suggesting that the regime in Tehran has sanctioned such an operation.
Furthermore, US officials quoted by the media outlet stated that the operation is not considered to be imminent and there are no signs that Iran has made up its mind to proceed with the alleged plans.
The White House stated that it monitors potential threats, but there are no credible ones for the US mainland at the moment of the statement.
The regime in Tehran dismissed the allegations.
According to the Iran UN Mission, CNN reports are baseless, and the spokesperson of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the claims of the report an attempt to frighten the public in order to justify hostile actions.
So what’s a dirty bomb? Does Iran have the capability to build one and how credible are the threats that have been reported?
What is a dirty bomb?
A dirty bomb (also known as a Radiological Dispersal Device) is a weapon which combines conventional explosives with radioactive material.
When it goes off the explosive disperses radioactive material into the surrounding environment. It’s not going to produce a nuclear explosion and it won’t have the huge amount of destructive energy of a nuclear weapon.
Its main effects would probably be localised contamination, disruption, panic in the public and the potential for the evacuation of the area.
The level of contamination would be a function of a number of factors including the type and amount of radioactive material used, the yield of the explosion and the weather conditions.
Depending on the substance in question exposure could be a health hazard, though the immediate physical destruction would of course be due to the conventional explosive rather than the nuclear reaction.
Does Iran have the materials to build one?
Iran’s nuclear programme has been under the microscope for years, especially with regard to its uranium enrichment activities.
As of June 2025 the IAEA had estimated that Iran had about 440kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent.
However highly enriched uranium is not necessarily the most practical material for a dirty bomb. Uranium is a relatively weakly radioactive material when compared to some of the other radioactive materials that you’ll find in industrial and medical applications.
Materials such as Cs-137 and Co-60 are regarded as more appropriate for a RDD [radiological dispersal device] on the grounds of their radioactivity.
Such substances are used in a number of medical, industrial and research applications and can be found in facilities in various countries.
The potential for access to radioactive material is not just limited to Iran. A number of states and non-state actors could in theory gain access to material which could be misused.
Nonetheless access to radioactive material in no way automatically confers the capability to build an effective weapon let alone the intent to do so.
How serious is the threat as reported?
The key issue is the distinction between a nation’s technical capability and its intent to carry out an attack. That’s the issue at the heart of the allegations against Iran.
Although it’s accepted by experts that Iran could in principle get access to or have access to the kind of material that would be required for a radiological device, that doesn’t in any way establish that the Iranian leadership have authorised an operation of that kind.
An attack of that nature carried out within American territory would also present a host of operational problems.
Iran doesn’t have the conventional long range military capability to go after Washington DC directly. Any such operation would almost certainly require a network of clandestine operatives, access to the materials and the ability to move and deploy the device without being detected.
There would also be significant strategic consequences.
An attack involving a radiological material on American soil would in all likelihood trigger a major military response, would further isolate Tehran on the world stage and could well see the conflict escalate.
These considerations by no means rule out the possibility of a threat, they just serve to highlight the fact that an intelligence assessment is very different from evidence of an approved operational plan.
Has a dirty bomb ever been used?
There has been no confirmed successful dirty bomb attack.
However there have been a number of incidents which have raised concerns about attempts to acquire or use radioactive materials.
In 1995 radioactive caesium was reportedly left in a Moscow park by the Chechen separatists. It was found before it could be used in an attack.
Three years later a device with a radioactive source was found and defused in Chechnya.
In 2002 Jose Padilla was arrested by US authorities on allegations that he was involved in a plot to build a dirty bomb. He was not ultimately charged with that particular offence.
In 2013 a truck carrying cobalt-60 was stolen in Mexico. The cobalt-60 was eventually recovered.
These cases do show that radioactive material can be a security issue, but they don’t in any way prove that a working dirty bomb has actually been detonated.
Why are the allegations coming out now?
The report comes in the context of the long running US-Iran confrontation, with diplomacy to resolve the situation clearly at a standstill.
President Trump has said that Washington doesn’t necessarily need an agreement with Tehran and at the same time we’ve seen a significant increase in our military presence in the region.
The arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt has brought the number of US carriers in the region up to three.
Given that background, the allegations of a possible Iranian attack on US personnel are clearly of significant political and security relevance.
They could affect public perception of the conflict, influence military thinking and impact the prospects for diplomacy.
However the timing of the report in itself doesn’t establish that the allegations are politically motivated or that they are in any way inaccurate.
The claims have to be judged on the strength of the evidence available.
The Iraq precedent and concerns about intelligence
The allegations have also served to re-open the door to comparison with the intelligence claims that went before the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq.
Prior to that invasion the Bush administration was arguing that Saddam Hussein had WMDS and was a threat to international security.
In February 2003 then US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the intelligence to the UN Security Council in support of the US position.
But after the invasion the very weapons stocks which had been the raison d’etre for the war were not there.
A 2005 presidential commission subsequently concluded that the US intelligence estimates regarding Iraq’s weapons programmes were seriously wrong.
The episode is still a prime example of the dangers of intelligence failure, particularly when the claims in question are of the WMD variety and form the basis of a decision to go to war.
Another historical reference point is the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident which was used by President Johnson to get Congress to back the escalation of US military involvement in Vietnam. There were subsequent questions about the circumstances of the second reported attack on the US ships.
These precedents in no way establish that the current allegations against Iran are false. They simply show why any allegations of a nature which would involve national security and potentially military action would need to be properly verified.
What happens next?
For the moment, a number of very significant questions remain unasked.
There’s absolutely no publicly available evidence that the Iranian leadership have approved a dirty bomb or a chemical weapon attack on US personnel. The report gives absolutely no indication that such an operation is on the horizon.
The allegations remain the assertions of unnamed US officials (intelligence claims) and Tehran has categorically dismissed them.
Further info from the US intelligence agencies, from independent investigations or from official assessments may well be required to determine whether the reported activity constitutes an actual operational threat or is simply an initial assessment of potential scenarios.
Until that point it is vital to distinguish between what the intelligence people are reportedly afraid of and what has in fact been independently established.
The key issue isn’t just whether Iran could get the radioactive material or build a radiological device. The question is whether there is any credible evidence that the Iranian government has a plan to use such a device against the US.



