By Chris Agbedo
The scene outside Chatham House, London, on Thursday, 12 November 2026, was an uncomfortable spectacle for Nigeria’s democracy. Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan, Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), had just participated in a discussion on Nigeria’s 2027 elections and democratic trajectory when a group of Nigerian protesters confronted the vehicle conveying him. Their message was unmistakable: they had lost confidence in the electoral umpire and wanted answers. Some demanded his resignation, accusing INEC of compromising its impartiality and manipulating the electoral process in favour of President Bola Tinubu and the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC).
The protesters cited alleged irregularities in the preliminary voters’ register, including duplicate entries, suspected artificial intelligence-generated photographs and questionable voter records. Their language was confrontational; their allegations were grave. Yet, beneath the spectacle of placards, angry chants and a besieged official vehicle lay a question that Nigeria cannot afford to evade: Can the institution entrusted with protecting the people’s electoral mandate command the confidence of the very people whose mandate it is supposed to protect?
This is the real significance of the London confrontation. It is not simply about an aggrieved group of Nigerians heckling an INEC chairman abroad. It is about the credibility of an electoral institution approaching another consequential national election under the shadow of unresolved public distrust.
The location adds another dimension. Chatham House is an internationally recognised forum for discussions on governance, diplomacy and global affairs. That Nigeria’s electoral credibility crisis should manifest so publicly outside its premises is a reputational embarrassment. More importantly, it internationalises a domestic democratic anxiety. The Nigerian diaspora, often regarded as distant observers of the country’s political affairs, has demonstrated that geographical distance does not extinguish civic interest or the demand for institutional accountability. Nevertheless, democratic protest must remain peaceful, evidence-based and respectful of personal safety. Blocking a vehicle and hurling insults cannot establish electoral wrongdoing. Equally, the unruliness of a protest cannot invalidate the substance of legitimate questions.
The voters’ register is where the controversy becomes particularly consequential. An election begins long before ballot papers are distributed or voting cubicles are erected. It begins with the identification of eligible voters and the establishment of a credible register. The register determines who votes, where votes are cast and the numerical foundation upon which electoral outcomes are built. Its integrity is therefore not an administrative convenience; it is a fundamental condition of electoral legitimacy.
INEC’s recent disclosure that it removed 1,608,660 invalid registrations following its review of the 2025/2026 Continuous Voter Registration exercise is both significant and troubling. The commission also reported removing 873 records belonging to verified deceased persons and identifying 54 individuals across ten states for disciplinary action, including possible prosecution, over registration irregularities. The Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) was deployed to identify suspicious records requiring further examination.
To be fair, the discovery and removal of invalid registrations demonstrate that the Commission’s screening mechanisms can identify defects. Amupitan also cautioned that an automated flag does not automatically establish that a registration is fraudulent. Indeed, the subsequent review of 268,000 cases reportedly resulted in 217,722 invalidations, while 50,278 records were cleared and retained. This distinction is important: technological suspicion must be followed by proper verification and adjudication.
However, an uncomfortable question remains. How did such a substantial volume of questionable registrations enter the system in the first place? What administrative safeguards failed? Were the irregularities attributable to isolated acts of individual misconduct, systemic weaknesses or organised attempts to compromise the register? What happened to those responsible? Removing questionable records is necessary, but identifying and sanctioning the perpetrators is equally indispensable. The Commission must publish sufficient details of its investigations to demonstrate that its clean-up exercise is not merely cosmetic.
There is also a small but important arithmetic discrepancy in the publicly reported figures: 1,608,660 invalid registrations plus 873 deceased-voter records equals 1,609,533, whereas the reported combined figure is 1,609,553. The difference is only twenty records, but an institution demanding public confidence should have no difficulty reconciling and explaining even such discrepancies. Electoral transparency is built on attention to minute detail.
Beyond the register lies the larger question of INEC’s independence. Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution establishes INEC as a federal executive body, while Section 158 provides important safeguards against external direction or control in specified personnel matters. Section 157 also provides constitutional protection against arbitrary removal of the Commission’s chairman and members. These provisions are important institutional guardrails. But constitutional independence and demonstrable independence are not necessarily the same thing.
Legal independence concerns what the Constitution guarantees. Operational independence concerns the commission’s ability to perform its responsibilities without improper political interference. Perceived independence concerns whether citizens have reasonable grounds to believe that the institution is impartial. All three dimensions are essential to electoral credibility.
An electoral commission may enjoy constitutional protection and insist on its neutrality. But if its conduct, decisions or administrative arrangements generate persistent suspicions of political favouritism, its institutional credibility becomes vulnerable. The electoral umpire must not merely be independent; it must be seen to be independent.
And now the big elephant in the room, i.e., the constitutional paradox: Who appoints the electoral umpire? Here lies perhaps the most fundamental structural contradiction in Nigeria’s quest for an independent electoral commission. The Constitution that declares INEC independent simultaneously vests the appointment of its chairman and national commissioners in the President, who is himself a principal beneficiary of the electoral process administered by that Commission.
Section 154(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the chairman and members of constitutionally established federal bodies, including INEC, shall be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Section 154(3) additionally requires the President to consult the Council of State in making appointments to INEC. These are constitutional checks, but they do not remove the President from the centre of the appointment process.
Consider the institutional dilemma. President Bola Tinubu, as the incumbent President and leader of the political establishment from which the ruling party derives its governmental authority, exercises the constitutional power to appoint the chairman and national commissioners who will preside over the electoral process in which his party and political associates are contestants. The same institution is expected to regulate the electoral activities of the incumbent government and its political opponents with scrupulous impartiality. How does one reconcile these potentially competing institutional interests?
To be clear, presidential appointment does not automatically make an appointee politically compromised, just as Senate confirmation does not automatically make an appointee independent. Nor does the appointment arrangement establish that Amupitan or any commissioner has pandered to presidential preferences. The issue is more fundamental than the character of any individual officeholder. It concerns the structural incentives and institutional dependencies embedded in the constitutional arrangement itself. Can an electoral umpire appointed by an incumbent President be entirely insulated from the political influence, expectations or preferences of the authority that appointed him? Can the public reasonably be expected to disregard the possibility of institutional indebtedness when the appointing authority is also a contestant in the political process being supervised?
The Council of State consultation and Senate confirmation provide additional layers of participation and scrutiny. However, consultation is not the same as an independent selection process, and confirmation does not necessarily displace the President’s initiating and appointing authority. The constitutional arrangement therefore leaves a legitimate question about whether the existing safeguards sufficiently separate electoral administration from executive political influence.
This is not an argument against the personal integrity of Amupitan or any previous INEC chairman. It is an argument for institutional architecture that does not place the credibility of the electoral umpire in the shadow of the political authority whose electoral fortunes it is expected to regulate. The independence of INEC must begin with the independence of the process through which its leadership emerges. Nigeria must therefore consider a constitutional amendment that transfers the primary responsibility for nominating and selecting the INEC chairman and national commissioners from the sitting President to an independent, constitutionally established, multi-stakeholder appointments mechanism. Such a body should have clearly defined representation, transparent nomination procedures, objective professional criteria, public scrutiny of shortlisted candidates and safeguards against partisan capture. Its recommendations should be subject to appropriate legislative confirmation, with the appointing function no longer resting in the hands of the incumbent President.
The process should also guarantee security of tenure, adequate financial autonomy and protection against arbitrary interference. The objective is not to create another political institution under a different name, but to construct an appointment architecture in which no single political authority controls the emergence of the leadership of the electoral umpire. This is the constitutional reform question that Nigeria must confront beyond the immediate controversy surrounding the 2027 elections. Until the appointment process is effectively insulated from the partisan interests of the incumbent political executive, the constitutional promise of INEC’s independence will continue to face a credibility deficit. An independent umpire should not have to depend on the political establishment for the circumstances of its emergence.
There is an even more immediate credibility challenge: the unresolved legacy of the 2023 elections. The controversy surrounding electronic transmission of results and the performance of the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) left a deep impression on the electorate. Amupitan himself acknowledged that the technical glitches experienced during the 2023 elections damaged public confidence. His assurance that additional safeguards are being developed for 2027 is encouraging, but Nigerians need more than assurances. Electronic transmission must be transparent, reliable and independently auditable. Polling-unit results must be authenticated and made accessible without undue delay. There must be clear procedures for reconciling physical result sheets with electronically transmitted records. Where network failures occur, the Commission must explain the contingency arrangements and demonstrate that technological difficulties cannot become convenient avenues for manipulating results. Technology should strengthen electoral accountability, not provide a sophisticated cover for institutional opacity.
The implications extend beyond INEC. Electoral integrity is a shared democratic responsibility involving political parties, security agencies, the judiciary, civil society, the media and the electorate. Political parties must respect electoral rules and refrain from violence, voter intimidation and disinformation. Security agencies must remain professionally neutral. The judiciary must dispense electoral justice without contradictory interventions, questionable procedural manoeuvres or judgments that undermine public confidence in the rule of law. The Commission, for its part, must apply electoral regulations consistently, irrespective of the political identity of those involved.
Selective enforcement is particularly dangerous. An electoral referee who condemns inflammatory campaign rhetoric from one political camp while overlooking comparable conduct from another invites accusations of partisan officiating. The same standard must apply to registration irregularities, campaign violations, polling misconduct and the handling of election results. Impartiality is not a favour extended to political opponents; it is an obligation owed to the Constitution and the electorate.
INEC’s published timetable places the presidential and National Assembly elections on 16 January 2027, with governorship and State Houses of Assembly elections scheduled for 6 February 2027. The institutional preparation required is therefore urgent. The Commission must publish credible information about the final voters’ register, disclose the outcomes of investigations into registration misconduct, subject its technological infrastructure to independent scrutiny and engage political parties and civil society in meaningful confidence-building consultations. The London incident should consequently be treated as an opportunity for institutional introspection, not an embarrassment to be dismissed or a confrontation to be forgotten. Amupitan should resist the temptation to interpret every criticism as partisan hostility. Equally, critics must recognise that allegations, however passionately expressed, require evidence. The burden of restoring confidence, however, rests substantially on the electoral institution. It is INEC that must demonstrate, through verifiable conduct, that the people’s electoral mandate is safe in its hands.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s democratic future cannot rest on the assumption that the declaration of an electoral winner automatically establishes the credibility of an election. Electoral legitimacy is earned through a process that is transparent, impartial, accountable and sufficiently defensible to command public confidence. A government may secure constitutional authority through an election, but the durability of its democratic legitimacy depends substantially on whether citizens believe that their votes genuinely determined the outcome.
The London confrontation is a warning signal, not a judicial verdict on INEC or a pre-emptive determination of the 2027 elections. But it exposes a dangerous credibility deficit that the commission must urgently address. Nigeria cannot afford to approach another general election with an electoral umpire whose integrity is already a subject of intense public controversy. INEC is not the property of the government, nor is it the electoral machinery of the ruling party. It is the constitutional trustee of the Nigerian electorate. Its loyalty must be to the Constitution, its conduct must be impartial, and its accountability must ultimately be to the Nigerian people.
The 2027 elections must be decided by voters, not by manipulated registers, technological opacity, political interference or institutional complicity. The ballot must remain the instrument of the people’s sovereign will. An independent INEC is not merely a constitutional requirement; it is a democratic necessity. And the test of that independence is not what the Commission says about itself, but what Nigerians can independently verify about its conduct. The question Nigeria must now ask is not simply whether INEC is independent under the Constitution, but whether the Constitution itself has provided the institutional conditions necessary for INEC to be truly independent.




