You have to suspend emotional reasoning if you want to relate to this commentary. Like a child, be pure in your heart and see Soludo and Peter Obi as two students competing for the best result to gain a sole scholarship.
The sole scholarship is up for grabs, and they are fighting for the best grade. Today, I want to discourse about two competitive students.
Let me get rid of allusion and be more direct.
Soludo and Obi are in a healthy competition for who will champion the Igbo presidency struggle. The two are fantastic options. I don’t have a choice yet, but let’s take a factual look into the prospects.
The Soludo you see in Anambra State Government House is using that position as a template and constructing his path to the presidency. There is a reason he is performing, and there is a possibility he will outperform Peter Obi by the time his eight years come to an end.
The scholarship in this context is the presidential office. An Igbo president is being considered, and the scorecards of all Igbo governors are being assessed.
When you wonder how Soludo is able to construct roads. Pay civil servants. Employ more teachers, and build infrastructure and social amenities. Establish a security outfit to fight insecurity. Provide multiple skill acquisitions and fund Anambra youths to make ends meet with the free skills acquired, free antenatal and post-antenatal care, free education, and hospitals for each local government with almost zero borrowing, and then you can start to see the bigger picture.
Governor Chukwuma Soludo is going to break more records in his second term. Frankly, I don’t want to talk about the coming governorship election because there is practically no election happening; it’s a one-horse race election.
If you keenly look at what Governor Chukwuma Soludo has achieved in his first term with almost zero borrowing, you would be forced to ask, “How is it possible?”
Past governors borrowed hundreds of billions and ended up constructing roads, but Chukwuma Soludo, throughout his 3.5 years, has constructed more roads and constructed a new government house. Touched social amenities and infrastructures, even funded youths like a father funds his sons after enrolling them in a school of skills acquisition. The roads he is constructing are more durable.
Soludo in three and a half years has practically done great in the state. Discussing with my friend, who told me that the governor is setting a new standard, I objected to him and made it clear that it would be hard for other governors to follow in his footsteps.
When Soludo came up with his tax initiative, the pain was sharp, but over time, it appears to have subsided because he is using the taxpayers’ money for projects in the state.
Soludo’s predecessor left an almost empty purse, and borrowing was inevitable, but his determination to run a government of inclusive financial responsibility led him to raise money within the state and use it judiciously.
Governor Alex Otti borrows hundreds of billions of Naira and constructs a road in Aba; social media obedients hail him like he had done any extraordinary thing, but when Soludo does even more without borrowing, the extraordinary achievement is met with deafening silence from them.
On social media, obedients have become mediocre and hypocritical. This is a fact and not criticism.
Peter Obi needs to come clean and end politics of emotion and pity. He is not a strategist, and one wonders how he would succeed in the strategic arena of Nigerian politics. If he continues to whip up emotions and sentiments with the hope of taking advantage of the two to win the Nigerian presidential election, then he is dreaming.
Soludo, on the other hand, is a strategist and realistic person. He is devoid of sentiment and embraces the toughness needed to lead. He tells you what he wants or will do and quickly proceeds to execution. Above all, he doesn’t claim to be holier than thou.
He contested the governorship election in 2010 against Peter Obi; after he lost the election, he went back and strategized. He waited and identified the right persons and won the election on the second attempt. That’s a strategic approach to execution.
Slimy characters who play the holier-than-thou game end up turning into beasts once given the mantra.
For instance, Peter Obi attended Rev. Father Mbaka’s fundraising service, but when called to donate money, he deceitfully objected. Why did he attend in the first place, and why can’t he donate like others? Because he wants to play the holier-than-thou game.
Like Soludo, Obi tried during his term as a governor. He saved money for the state, and that was his signature deed as a governor. But what is the essence of saving state money you could easily invest to help the people or maximize the stakes of the state?
My brother once told me that a man that runs every day to save his money in a bank is a man who doesn’t know what to do with the money he has. He said he would rather invest his money in something for inflow and outflow than primitively save it.
Soludo is someone that bares his mind irrespective of the odds against him. But I am afraid of Peter Obi’s cunning lifestyle.
Mr. Peter Obi has constantly said he didn’t borrow money during his term in office, but available records say otherwise. That is where my fear lies. Do we truly know who Peter Obi is? An angel you don’t know is not better than a devil you know. This is my stream of thought, and I have evidence.
When the Pandora Papers were leaked, to my greatest surprise, Peter Obi’s name was there, but we all feigned ignorance of the implication. Why was our spotless Messiah’s name on the list of those who hide their money to evade taxes? What was Peter hiding?
By virtue of the Pandora Papers, Peter has something in his cupboard. He should stop telling us about wearing only one pair of shoes. About not living lavishly. About not sleeping in five-star hotels and others. If he doesn’t do all these but has money hidden somewhere, those that do all he doesn’t do are better than him.
In this journey, we want a devil we know and not an angel we don’t know.
Before I end this commentary, I want to draw a significant line of comparison between these two students.
Soludo inherited Biafra-related insecurity. Peter Obi created Biafra-related insecurity during his term in office.
Soludo is fighting and dislodging camps of UGM in Anambra State without any major massacre. Peter Obi, during his time as governor, recorded the Ezu River massacre, etcetera.
Despite facing significant inherited security challenges, Soludo has not pressed the panic button by declaring endless curfews across the state. Under Peter, Anambra recorded curfews that threw the state in fear. Youths were massacred for having tribal marks in the process.
On the borrowing debate that Mr. Peter Obi put forward as the greatest thing he achieved in Anambra. I asked AI to gather all the official records of Anambra finances during his 8-year rule. Below is the verdict. AI says Mr. Peter Obi is a liar.
AI’s Verdict:
Records of Anambra State Finances from 2006 to 2014
Based on available data from official sources like the Nigerian Debt Management Office (DMO), secondary analyses (e.g., StatiSense, BudgIT reports), and fact-check reports, below is a summary of Anambra State’s financial records focusing on debt profiles during Peter Obi’s governorship (March 2006 to March 2014). Note that comprehensive year-by-year financial statements (e.g., full budgets, revenues, expenditures) are not always publicly detailed in accessible formats for every year, but debt data is the most relevant and available metric for assessing borrowing. Data inconsistencies exist across sources (e.g., due to reporting methods or updates), so I’ve noted sources and prioritized DMO-derived figures where possible.
Key Financial Context
Revenue and Budget Trends: Anambra’s annual budgets grew from approximately ₦66 billion in 2007 to ₦110 billion in 2014, driven by federal allocations, internally generated revenue (IGR), and grants. IGR increased from ₦4.5 billion in 2006 to ₦10.4 billion in 2013, reflecting Obi’s emphasis on fiscal prudence. Obi claimed to have left ₦75 billion in savings (including cash and investments) upon handover, though this is disputed as including overvalued assets or liabilities.
Overall Fiscal Performance: Anambra was rated the least indebted state by DMO in 2013-2014 relative to peers, with low debt-to-revenue ratios. However, debt obligations existed and fluctuated.
Sources Used: DMO reports (via secondary extractions like StatiSense and fact-checks), BudgIT’s “Nigeria’s Debt Status” PDF (2019), NBS reports, and verified fact-checks (e.g., Guardian, ICIR).
No full 2006-2010 domestic debt figures were directly extractable from DMO PDFs due to access limitations, but trends are inferred from available data.
Debt Records (External and Domestic)
Debt is divided into external (foreign loans, e.g., from the World Bank, multilateral agencies) and domestic (local borrowings, e.g., from banks or bonds). Figures show Anambra had inherited debt in 2006, with some increases during Obi’s tenure.
External Debt (in USD millions, sourced from DMO via StatiSense reports):
2006: $18.87 (inherited at start of tenure)
2008: $18.89 (minimal change)
2010: $21.30 (slight increase)
2012: $24.45
2013: $30.32 (per DMO fact-check data)
2014: $45.15 (end of tenure; note: Obi left office in March 2014, so part of this may reflect early-year draws)
Trend: External debt more than doubled from $18.87M to $45.15M, indicating new borrowings or drawdowns on existing facilities (e.g., World Bank loans for erosion control and education, some allocated for post-tenure use).
Domestic Debt (in ₦ billions, sourced from BudgIT PDF, DMO via fact-checks, and Nairaland/DMO summaries; inconsistencies noted):
2006-2010: No precise year-by-year figures found in accessible DMO data. Aggregated state domestic debt nationally was rising post-2005 Paris Club relief, but Anambra’s share was low (estimated at <₦5B in 2006 based on trends; exact amount unconfirmed).
2011: ₦6.43 (per DMO via Nairaland) or ₦10.30 (per BudgIT; possible reporting variance)
2012: ₦18.47 (per BudgIT)
2013: ₦3.03 (per DMO fact-check) or ₦7.86 (per BudgIT)
2014: ₦11.05 (per BudgIT; post-handover figure, but reflective of end-2013 obligations)
Trend: Domestic debt fluctuated, peaking around 2012 before declining in 2013 (possibly due to repayments), then rising slightly by 2014. Overall, it remained low compared to other states (e.g., Lagos had ₦200B+ in 2013).
Total Debt (Combined External + Domestic, approximate conversions at historical rates of ~₦150-200/USD):
2006: ~$18.87M external + estimated low domestic (<₦5B) = Total ~₦3-5B equivalent.
2013 (near end of tenure): $30.32M external (~₦4.8B) + ₦3.03B domestic = Total ~₦7.8B.
2014: $45.15M external (~₦7.2B) + ₦11.05B domestic = Total ~₦18.25B.
Other Financial Notes:
Liabilities Beyond Loans: Obi inherited ₦35B in unpaid pensions/gratuities (cleared during tenure). Successor Willie Obiano claimed ₦127B in liabilities (e.g., unfinished contracts), not all loans.
Savings and Investments: Obi reported leaving $156M in foreign savings and ₦36B in cash/investments, verified by DMO as contributing to low net debt.
Borrowing Specifics: Mentions of a $60M World Bank interest-free loan (negotiated but for successor) and ₦1B farmer loans (state-facilitated, not direct state debt).
Data Gaps: Full audits for 2006-2010 are scarce; DMO annual reports focus on national aggregates, not state breakdowns pre-2011.
Verdict on Whether Peter Obi Loaned or Borrowed Money:
Yes, Peter Obi did oversee the collection of loans or borrowings during his tenure as Anambra State governor. While Obi has claimed he “never borrowed from any financial institution” and left no debt, this is misleading based on official DMO records.
The state carried and increased debt obligations under his administration:
Evidence of Borrowing: External debt rose from $18.87M (inherited) in 2006 to $45.15M in 2014, a ~140% increase, implying new loans or drawdowns (e.g., multilateral facilities). Domestic debt, though fluctuating and low, was present and managed, with peaks suggesting borrowings for projects.
Nuances: Much debt may have been inherited or non-commercial (e.g., World Bank grants/loans for infrastructure). Obi emphasized avoiding “unproductive” borrowing, clearing liabilities like pensions, and leaving savings—Anambra was indeed the least indebted state per DMO. However, formal debt existed and grew, contradicting absolute “no debt” claims.
Fact-Check Consensus: Multiple verifications (e.g., Guardian, ICIR) rate his no-debt claim as false or misleading, citing DMO data showing ~₦7.8B total debt in 2013.
In summary, while fiscally prudent overall, the records confirm borrowing occurred.
Author: Ifeanyi Chijioke