By Emeka Ugwuonye
The conviction of Nnamdi Kanu on November 20, 2025, appears to be a near certainty. As we contemplate his fate, it’s essential to focus on what will happen after he is convicted and sentenced, rather than getting caught up in debates about rendition, repealed laws, or other issues that primarily serve to entertain some and fuel the egos of his IPOB followers.
One potential outcome is that Kanu will be transferred to Kuje Correctional Center, a significant change from his current detention at the DSS facility. In Kuje Prison, Kanu will have privileges that he did not enjoy in the DSS, including less restrictive monitoring and access to regulated visits. He will likely receive visits from various politicians who wish to feign concern, as well as from his supporters and followers who view him as a messiah. The prison will become their new holy land.
Financially, he should not have any problem: Biafra is a selling brand. Unlike at the DSS facility, where communication with the outside world was limited, he will have access to a phone in prison, enabling him to manage his activities and issue directives to IPOB members from behind bars.
The prison authority has the power to transfer him to any other prison in Nigeria. However, there are compelling reasons why Kanu will probably remain in Kuje Prison. First, he will inevitably file an appeal at the Abuja Court of Appeal, making it essential for him to be in close proximity to his lawyers as they prepare for this process. Second, there are valid safety concerns; transferring him to prisons in northern states could expose him to threats, including possible harm from Boko Haram members, while relocating him to southern prisons carries the risk of escape.
After his conviction, filing an appeal will be one of Kanu’s immediate actions. Unfortunately, his chances of success may be severely impacted by his earlier decision not to present a defense during the trial. The appeal court primarily reviews the performance of the lower court and does not accept new evidence; therefore, Kanu’s failure to mount any defense will significantly complicate his efforts to overturn the judgment. What basis could he have for reversing the verdict when he didn’t provide a counter-argument for consideration? By choosing to represent himself and refusing to submit a defense, he has effectively hampered his own case.
Additionally, the support of Igbo politicians may not be as reliable as some might hope. Many do not want Kanu released, viewing him as a potential threat to the status quo. Their apparent concern is often driven by fear rather than genuine support. Politicians like Charles Soludo and Peter Mbah have recently secured their positions; they are vulnerable to IPOB sympathizers.
With the 2027 elections on the horizon, it is doubtful that they would want Kanu released before the election cycle, as his presence could contribute to instability. Consequently, the length of time Kanu spends in prison remains uncertain. The corrections officials might also impose limitations on his privileges, restricting his access to communication and potentially making his experience in prison more difficult.
Furthermore, the DSS may advocate for continued surveillance, convincing prison authorities that they need to monitor Kanu closely, even while he is incarcerated. This ongoing oversight could lead to further restrictions on Kanu’s ability to communicate privately with his supporters.
Many unknown factors still surround the situation, but one thing is clear: Kanu’s journey from conviction to potential pardon will be fraught with challenges, uncertainties, and the complex dynamics of Nigerian politics. As events unfold, it will be crucial to observe how these factors will influence Kanu’s fate in the coming months.
