Al-Assad’s fall for Syria: Wetin don dey for China?

China bin don quietly join hand with al-Assad through United Nation Security Council (UNSC) vetoes, investments and aid, but dem no dey directly involved for di war like Iran or Russia.

As China bin don host di 19th Asian Games for September last year, President Xi Jinping come welcome Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad for one picturesque lakeside guesthouse for di Eastern City of Hangzhou.

By di time Xi and al-Assad don join force togeda from dia meeting, China and Syria don strike wetin dem call “strategic Partnership.”

“Strategic Partnership” here mean say na one agreement wey dem two get to take work togeda to take dia achieve common goals or objectives.

Dis kind partnership dey involve collaboration and cooperation for areas like business, technology, research, or development.

Di partners dey share resources, expertise, and risks to take create mutual benefits and long-term success.

Strategic partnerships dey sometime formed to take gain competitive advantage, enta new markets, or take push new innovation.

E no tay, like over one year later, dat partnership dey scatter, afta opposition rebel groups, wey Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) dey lead, take come hold di Syrian capital Damascus for Sunday, take collect power from Al-Assad, wey bin don come run go Russia.

Since then, China don dey worry as dem dey think how dem want take response come act put for di dis kind big change wey jus happen for Syria.

Na so one Monday, di Chinese foreign ministry come talk say one “political solution” dem must to find solution for Syria quick-quick to take restore stability.

But while dem dey think of dat, dem dey careful also as dis join how China don take build di relationship with Syria for big way.

Di Al-Assad’s sudden ouster don dey affect di world’s second-largest economy just as e dey increasingly try to expand for footprint for di Middle East, na one analysts talk.

So wetin go come be China relationship with Syria, and how e go take change with di new leadership for Damascus?

Wetin happen for Syria?

Di Syrian war start from 2011 afta al-Assad e fit involve strict enforcement of laws, wey go increased penalties protests against him government.

Di protests then come dey develop enta rebellion, with plenty groups wey dey involved.

Di governments of Russia and Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and some other Iran groups wey join hand togeda for di region don back al-Assad.

Di United States, Turkiye, and most of di Middle Eastern nations don dey critical of al-Assad, and him brutal crackdown for civilian populations and di political opposition.

For November 27, some groups wey say dem no go gree, wey Hayat Tahrir al-Sham dey lead, come launch major offensive from dia base for di Idlib governorate for northwestern Syria.

For like three days, di opposition fighters come take Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo.

Afta over one week later, dem come still take over Damascus.

Na Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov come tell reporters on Monday say dey don give al-Assad asylum for Russia.

Wetin go come China’s relationship with al-Assad like dis now?

Officially, China don dey coy about taking sides over di future direction of Syria since di collapse of di al-Assad regime.

“Di future and destiny of Syria suppose dey decided by di Syrian pipo, and we hope say all di important parties go find one political solution to take restore stability and order as soon as possible,” Mao Ning, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson talk dis one for one regular news conference on Monday.

However, as China no come get direct military involvement for di Syrian war mata unlike Iran and Russia, di relationship between Damascus and Beijing dey comfortable while al-Assad dey office. And e dey grow warmer.

Di Syrian leader’s Hangzhou visit na him first official trip to di country for almost two decades.

During dis trip, China pipo come promise to help al-Assad with Syria’s reconstruction afta more than one decade of war, for dat time wen di Syrian leader be pariah for many nations around di world.

“Faced with one international situation wey dey full of instability and some things wey no dey sure, China dey willing to take continue to work togeda with Syria.

Firmly support each other, promote friendly cooperation, and jointly defend international fairness and justice,” Xi tell al-Assad, according to Chinese state media. Xi add say relations between di two countries “don withstand di test of international changes.”

Di protection of di Diplomatic for al-Assad

China don use its veto power for di United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to block draft resolutions critical of al-Assad on 10 occasions. Dat na out of 30 resolutions related to di Syrian war wey dem propose for di UNSC.

For July 2020, for instance, Russia and China veto one draft resolution to extend aid deliveries from Turkiye to Syria.

Di reason behind di veto, di countries talk, na say e violate Syria’s sovereignty and say di aid suppose dey distributed by Syrian authorities. Di remaining 13 members vote for di resolution to pass.

China’s UN ambassador Zhang Jun blame unilateral sanctions against Syria for worsening di humanitarian situation for di country. Di sanctions don dey placed by di United States and di European Union.

For September 2019, Russia and China veto one draft resolution wey call for ceasefire for Syria’s Idlib, one rebel strong-hold.

“I think di Chinese, as dem don do fair few times, don go along with di Russians for solidarity but e really be di Russian objection to dis resolution,” Al Jazeera’s Diplomatic Editor James Bays talk then.

Chinese money for al-Assad’s Syria

But China don be more than sidekick to Russia for Syria. For di last decade, China ramp up its financial assistance to Syria, one indicator of its backing of al-Assad’s government.

For December 2016, di Syrian government secure victory against di rebels wen dem retake di city of Aleppo.

Dis mark turning point for China’s aid strategy, according to di Cyprus-headquartered independent risk and development consultancy, di Centre for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR).

China’s aid to Syria jump 100 times from roughly $500,000 for 2016 to $54m for 2017, according to COAR reports.

For October 2018, China donate 800 electrical power generators to Latakia, Syria’s largest port.

Beijing don also make major, long-term investments for Syrian oil and gas wey don total about $3bn.

For 2008, China’s petrochemical enterprise Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation buy Canada’s Calgary-based Tanganyika Oil company in one deal worth about $2bn.

Tanganyika get production-sharing agreement with Syria and hold operating interests for two Syrian properties.

For 2009, China’s state-owned multinational company Sinochem buy British oil and gas explorer Emerald Energy, wey dey operate for Syria, for $878m.

And for 2010, di China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) sign agreement with Shell to acquire 35 percent stake for Shell’s Syria unit.

Earlier dis year, Syria’s Minister of Electricity Ghassan Al-Zamel confirm one 38.2 million-euro (about $40m) contract with one Chinese company to construct one large photovoltaic plant near Syria’s western city Homs, according to Berlin-based publication, Di Syria Report.

For 2022, Syria also join Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one network of highways, ports and railroads wey China dey build, connecting Asia to Africa, Europe and Latin America.

Investments for Syria since its entry into di BRI don dey slow, and facing di threat of secondary US sanctions, China don divest from some of its projects for Syria in recent years.

Still, China don be Syria’s third-biggest source of imports behind Turkiye and di United Arab Emirates, according to di Observatory of Economic Complexity.

For 2022, China’s exports to Syria stand at $424m, driven by fabric, iron and rubber tyres.

Syria’s exports to China dey negligible by comparison and dey dominated by soap, olive oil and other vegetable products.

How di situation for Syria go affect China?

For China, “di fall of Assad dey represent di loss of one diplomatic partner,” William Matthews, one senior research fellow for di Asia Pacific Programme for London-based think tank Chatham House, tell Al Jazeera.

“China’s overall approach for di region don be one of pragmatic engagement,” Matthews add.

E talk say while di HTS “unlikely to dey keen to work with China as close partner, China go most likely seek to maintain engagement with di new government, including with view to opportunities for cooperation.”

Matthews explain say China’s engagement with di Taliban for Afghanistan fit provide potential comparison “but e too early to talk so definitively.”

On January 30 dis year, Xi’s government be di first to officially recognize one Taliban diplomat since di group seize power for 2021.

While no country officially recognizes di Taliban-led government, Beijing recognize Bilal Karimi, one former Taliban spokesman, as official envoy to China. For 2023, many Chinese companies sign business deals with di Taliban government.

Di fact say “China remain on good terms” with di Taliban, Andrew Leung, one international and independent China strategist, talk, suggest say “HTS unlikely to pose critical problem for China.”

Leung, wey don hold many senior government positions for Hong Kong, add: “Indeed, China’s infrastructure building capacities dey likely to be sought afta for di war-torn Middle East.”

However, how China go respond to dat demand for investments dey unclear.

“Given say China don adopt more cautious approach to overseas investments in recent years, while e dey possible say China fit make new investments for Syria, these go likely dey calibrated against di risk of instability and potential opportunities for increased longer-term influence,” Matthews talk.

E add say al-Assad’s fall pose challenge for China because “China get growing interests for di Middle East region as economic and development partner, and increasingly for areas such as technology and defence.”

For March 2023, China broker one diplomatic detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Di deal come as surprise, afta years of simmering tensions and formal cutting of ties between di two countries for 2016.

For July dis year, Beijing host rival Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah, alongside 12 smaller Palestinian groups.

Afta three days of intensive talks, di groups sign one “national unity” agreement aimed at maintaining Palestinian control over Gaza afta Israel’s war on di enclave don end.

According to Matthews, “di key setback for China na di risk Assad’s overthrow pose for regional stability, including di spillover of conflict into neighboring countries.”

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