Second, once the constitutional guarantee of democratically elected local council governments have been strengthened, it will be necessary to then de-list the names of the LGAs from the constitution, so that states as federating units, and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution can then decide and establish any number of such local government areas as may be deemed necessary for the development of the state.
ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONS:
One craze fashionable among the political elites is the competitive race to federally establish regional development commissions.
Whereas the establishment of special commissions to address historical disadvantages is necessary and ought to be encouraged; it is the mode of their establishment that weighs significantly on the Federation and combines to heighten group tensions.
In their current forms, they are merely conduit pipes for cornering shares of the proverbial national cake by regional elites.
Every regional commission established through Federal legislation disempowers rather than empowers the disadvantaged regions.
It takes some of the powers of the region over its own autonomous development away from the region and vests it in the federal government.
Thus the Federal government establishes the commission, and constitutes its governing board and management.
The implication of this is that the Federal government thus takes over the power to determine the strategic policies and directions of these regional commissions, from appointments to design, planning and implementation of intervention programs.
Of course the Federal Government also funds the commissions. The implication being that resources which ought to accrue to the Federation Account and then allocated to the tiers of government are diminished.
Ultimately the shares of the federating units of the federation account is the one most affected and most undermined.
If Nigeria’s political elites are not simply and only interested in access to, control and looting of collective treasury; if they are genuinely interested in human development and empowerment of citizens, and not just in their own greed and selfishness; if they were Nation Builders, and not Nation Wreckers; then there ought to be a different, more human and national development oriented path towards addressing disadvantages.
What we should be encouraging as not just a way of deepening democratisation, strengthening Federalism, and enabling equitable nation building is a system whereby the state governments of each region desiring a regional development commission, jointly establish such regional commissions through the simultaneous enactment of the Regional Development Commission Establishment Act by their respective state assemblies.
This way they retain control over the strategic direction and thrust of the regional development commission.
As a way of guaranteeing the funding base of such regional commissions jointly established by states within the region; we can then have a Federally established Special Development Commission and Fund, that also contributes to the funding of the regional commissions in addition to the statutory funds contributed by the establishing state governments.
In this respect, it seems to me a further weakening of the Federal arrangement, that tilts the balance of power predominantly to the Federal centre to continue to seek to enact Federal laws to establish Federally funded and controlled regional development commissions.
Section 83 of the 1999 constitution which already vests in the NASS the power to make law for the establishment of contingency funds already lays the foundation for the establishment of such a Federal Development Intervention Contingency Fund, from which Regional Commissions jointly established by collaborating states can draw part of their funding.
APPROPRIATION POWERS OF THE FEDERATION:
A further contentious area in the contemporary practice of Nigeria’s polity is the contention between the Executive and Legislature over passage of annual budgets or appropriation laws.
Sections 80, 81, & 82 of the 1999 constitution makes copious an seemingly unambiguous provisions with respect to the power to appropriate.
This is vested in the legislative assembly. However, with respect to the appropriations act and the annual budget, the constitutions vest the power to prepare the estimates and to lay it before the legislative assembly in the President or Governor of a state, that is in the Executive arm of government; while vesting the power to consider and approve the estimates in the legislature.
The implication is that the constitution in keeping with the principle of separation of powers vests the power to prepare and lay the estimates in the Executive; while vesting the power to consider and approve in the Legislature.
It stands to reason that the power to approve includes the power to reject, while the power to consider also includes the power to vary the estimates.
However, the power to reject and vary the estimates made and presented by the Executive cannot be deemed to be so broad as to imply the power to significantly alter the estimates.
Once the prepared estimates are significantly altered, it becomes the usurpation of the power to prepare.
